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I.

INTRODUCTION

Renowned Minnesota construction attorney B.C. Hart
remarked in 1972 that the government had given birth to a
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1

construction method of undefined lineage.
Ten years later,
2
construction management still escaped classification. Today, we
are no closer to its capture.
Generally, a construction manager (CM) provides clients with
expert construction advice, ranging from design constructability
and scheduling to procurement and quality control; but as this
article explains, conflicting presumptions exist as to what else a CM
provides. Failing to decide on the precise use for CM—and the
resulting wide variance in applying the CM label—frustrates the
3
industry. Moreover, failing to provide a coherent framework for
judges and arbitrators creates needless risk and cost. This article
first discusses the impact of these failures and concludes that the
industry benefits from taking a uniform approach to the CM
4
delivery method. Next, the article explains that striking the CM
approach in an agency die condenses and anneals the model’s vital
elements, while expelling the impurities that have seeped in from
5
other delivery methods.
6
For decades, the CM label has run out of control.
Undoubtedly, a single article such as this will have little impact on
an industry as scattered as construction. This article, therefore,
addresses a more practical audience: the advocates and arbiters
who deal with the CM label daily. Understanding the economic
1. B.C. Hart, Construction Management “CM for Short”: The New Name for an Old
Game, 8 FORUM 210, 210–11 (1972). The Public Buildings Service of the General
Services Administration announced the use of Construction Management on
March 17, 1970. Id. at 210.
2. Milton F. Lunch, New Construction Methods and New Roles for Engineers, 46
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83 (1983) (“The one, and probably only, area of
agreement regarding construction management is that there is no consensus as to
what it is, what it ought to be, and how it should be applied.”).
3. Michael Kenig, vice-chairman of an Atlanta construction firm, voiced
these concerns in the commentary section of Engineering News-Record:
One example [of the lack of a common vocabulary] is the lack of
consensus on the definition of CM at-risk, also known as CM/GC, CMc,
GC/CM, etc. A large number of private owners are using CM at-risk
without calling it that. How are we going to start cataloguing lessons
learned that can be developed into industry-wide best practices if we
don’t even know what process we’re talking about?
If we stay on our current course without common terminology . . .
[w]e are going to keep doing what we have always done — making the
same mistakes over and over again.
Michael Kenig, The Industry Needs Common Language, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Feb.
28, 2005, at 67.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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function of CM project delivery provides the knowledge necessary
to control the CM label, while the underpinnings of agency allow
turning that understanding into earnings.
II. THE PROBLEM
The inability to communicate razed the Tower of Babel,
7
Observing
civilization’s first great construction project.
8
humankind’s endless potential as one people with a single tongue,
God “confused their language” so they could not understand one
9
another. Unable to communicate, the builders soon abandoned
their ambitious project and scattered themselves over the face of
10
the earth.
While confusion over the meaning of construction
management does not confound with nearly the same magnitude,
this Old Testament story illustrates a reality affecting both
construction and the law: far less is possible without a common
understanding amongst participants.
A. Risky Business
Earning a profit in construction requires digging for pennies
in a minefield. The headwaters of this risky business first gather
around its lack of vertical integration. Construction can hardly
boast one-stop shopping. Not only does the Owner traditionally
buy a design and a building from two different sources, but the
parties themselves extend hopelessly outward in order to meet
11
their contractual obligations. The magic of raising a glass and
brick laboratory, for example, from the raw elements of cement
dust, iron ore, clay, and sand requires endless horizontal contracts
with specialty designers, tiers of subcontractors, and chains of
manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors.
To make matters worse, many people are in the minefield
looking for the same pennies. For instance, construction had six
7. See Genesis 11 (New Revised Standard Version).
8. Id. at 11:6 (“And the Lord said, ‘Look, they are one people, and they have
all one language; and this is only the beginning of what they will do; nothing that
they propose to do will now be impossible for them.’”).
9. See id. at 11:7 (“Come, let us go down, and confuse their language there,
so that they will not understand one another’s speech.”).
10. See id. at 11:8.
11. See JEREMIAH D. LAMBERT & LAWRENCE WHITE, HANDBOOK OF MODERN
CONSTRUCTION LAW 100–10 (1982).
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times as many suppliers sharing the same dollar in 2002 as
12
wholesale trade, the single largest sector of the U.S. economy. As
the economy’s sixth largest sector, construction shared $1.2 trillion
with 710,000 suppliers. By comparison, wholesale trade shared
nearly four times that amount amongst a far fewer 440,000
13
suppliers.
Moreover, these construction suppliers are mostly
14
Thus, the
small, undercapitalized, and financially unstable.
extent of this fracturing, coupled with low-entry barriers, translates
15
into expanded risk and high competition.
Razor-thin margins
result, leaving only pennies for contractors.
For construction’s customers, the inescapable reality is that
16
building is a means to an end. In meeting this end, poor timing
has always plagued the industry. As early as the 1930s, for example,
economists in Chicago found that by the time construction caught
up with demand for office space, the demand had already begun to
17
Naturally, this led to an oversupply in the market and
wane.
18
falling rents. This illustrates how construction’s transaction costs,
due in this case to long lead times, keep a constant pressure on
demand.
Transaction costs also arise from the uncertain nature of
19
construction itself.
This inherent uncertainty compounds the
12. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS tbl.1 (2002),
http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0200ccomp.
pdf. Wholesale trade generated $4.6 trillion using 440,000 suppliers, or 95,000
suppliers for every $1 trillion generated; compare this to construction’s crowded
590,000 suppliers for each $1 trillion generated. See id. Thought of another way,
the average wholesale trade participant supplies $10.5 million to the sector, while
the average construction participant supplies only $1.7 million. See id.
13. Id.
14. See LAMBERT & WHITE, supra note 11, at 193.
15. An index of publicly traded companies in the General Contractor
industry reveals a net profit margin of 3.2%, compared to 6.2% for the entire
Industrial Goods sector.
See Yahoo! Finance General Contractors Page,
http://biz.yahoo.com/p/636qpmu.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
16. It is axiomatic that no public or private interest will build for the sake of
building. Therefore, an Owner’s ultimate interest when contracting with builders
is the deliverable due at the end of the project. See Richard D. Conner, Contracting
for Construction Management Services, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6–8 (1983).
17. See The Skyscraper Boom: Better than Flying, ECONOMIST, June 3–9, 2006, at
67.
18. Id.
19. This proposition has been supported ad nauseam by quoting Blake
Construction Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Even the
most painstaking planning frequently turns out to be mere conjecture and
accommodation to changes must necessarily be of the rough, quick and ad hoc
sort, analogous to ever-changing commands on the battlefield.”). See, e.g., John D.
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diminishing profit margin problem and adds a layer of risk that is
20
unattractive to many investors. Thus, it is no surprise that the
largest U.S. corporation earns in one quarter what the largest U.S.
21
contractor sells in an entire year.
It is important to understand that risk lies at the heart of all
22
construction.
The construction industry sweeps across a
23
financially diverse group of owners, contractors, and designers,
creating unique risk and a unique means of governing and
24
allocating that risk. Thus, a necessary allocative and distributive
purpose for construction exists: to place risk with those who can
25
control it, transfer it, and maximize the cost-benefit of bearing it.
The contractor, in particular, is uniquely positioned to affect this
26
process.
B. Finding the Pennies
Our built environment results from combining three
27
fundamental elements: customers, designers, and builders.
Darling, Delay of Game, 26 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 5, 5 (2006); Michael R. Finke,
Claims for Construction Productivity Losses, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 311, 315 n.17 (1997).
20. See 2 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR
ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 7:10 n.1 (2002) (“This competitive environment, coupled
with the inherent uncertainty of the construction process, partially explains why
construction companies rarely find favor on Wall Street or with non-management
investors.”).
21. Exxon Mobile sat atop the Fortune 500 in 2006, reporting a before-tax
profit of $18.2 billion for the third quarter of the 2006–2007 fiscal year. Fortune
500 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 2006, at F-1; Exxon Mobile Corp.’s
Income Statement, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=XOM (last visited Oct. 25,
2007). By comparison, the Bechtel Group, Engineering News-Record’s top U.S.
contractor had sales of $20.5 billion for all of 2006 based on 2005 revenue, Gary J.
Tulacz, The Top 400 Contractors, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC, May 22, 2006, at 60;
BECHTEL, BECHTEL REPORT 3 (2007), http://www.bechtel.com/AnnualReport/
2007Report.pdf.
22. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 7:10.
23. Id. § 7:179.
24. See id. §§ 7:17–:18.
25. Id. § 7:10 (quoting Max Abrahamson, Risk Management, 2 INT’L CONST. L.
REV. 241, 244 (1984)).
26. See Carl J. Circo, Contract Theory and Contract Practice: Allocating Design
Responsibility in the Construction Industry, 58 FLA. L. REV. 561, 601 (July 2006)
[hereinafter Contract Theory]. “Building contractors specialize in managing
construction risks . . . . By trade and experience, they are well-equipped to
evaluate those risks and to establish fees based on the nature and extent of the
construction risks they assume by contract.” Id.
27. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:1. Even the CM delivery
system discussed throughout this article does not add an additional element to the
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Traditionally, these elements are cast in three distinct characters.
The customer element, represented generically by “the Owner,” is
28
central to all construction. Under a traditional framework, the
Owner gathers the remaining elements under two separate
contracts, forming the compartmentalized tripartite arrangement
29
of traditional construction delivery.
Over time, these elements have mixed together in countless
30
ways to efficiently allocate and spread the risks inherent in
pushing back rivers, scratching roads through wilderness, and
31
raising skyscrapers from marshes.
In the process, the
compartmentalization of the tripartite system has dissolved as
32
markets find more efficient formulations for transferring risk. As
this continues to occur, the three primary elements further blend
into various hues and reallocate themselves amongst hybrid
33
parties.
Construction management is an example of this market
influence.
Construction management emerged from “the
perceived weaknesses and inefficiencies” of the traditional tripartite
construction process. See id. § 6:57. Instead, the CM absorbs some of the
designing and building tasks traditionally carried out by architects and general
contractors, respectively. Id. The same is also true for design-build delivery:
although an owner contracts design duties to the builder, the builder will still have
to tap a designer, either through subcontract or direct employment, to develop
construction documents that achieve the Owner’s objectives. See id. § 6:15.
28. See id.
29. See Contract Theory, supra note 26, at 565 (describing the design-bid-build
process and the Owner’s separate contracts with the architect and builder).
30. See Carl J. Circo, When Specialty Designs Cause Building Disasters:
Responsibility for Shared Architectural and Engineering Services, 84 NEB. L. REV. 162, 168
(2005) [hereinafter Specialty Designs]. “Only feasibility and imagination limit the
possible variations in project delivery systems.” Id.
31. See generally 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, §§ 7:1–:14 (discussing
the allocative and distributive principles for construction risk).
32. See, e.g., Specialty Designs, supra note 30, at 206–07 (discussing the need to
re-allocate specialty design risk to subcontractors because the architect is not best
suited to bear such design responsibility).
33. See Hart, supra note 1, at 218 (presenting a prominent American
architect’s view of CM delivery as an intermediate stop on the way to permanently
dissolving the conflict-boundaries separating builder, Owner, and architect).
Compare Gary J. Tulacz, The Top 100: Owners Demand Broader Services, ENGINEERING
NEWS-REC., June 13, 2005, at 28 (describing the lack of standardization fueling an
ever expanding hybridization of delivery models and the need to define the nature
of construction management), with Conner, supra note 16, at 5 (“The catalyst for
[construction management] has been the owner’s determination to force the
construction industry to regard a highly fragmented series of discrete decisions
and events as a single process.”) (quoting Edward W. Davis & Lindsay White, How
to Avoid Construction Headaches, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 87, 93).
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34

approach. These weaknesses became apparent with technological
35
developments in the industry, the demand for greater control
36
over project costs and schedules, and design professionals seeking
37
Extremely
to avoid their traditional liability as master builder.
high interest rates and inflation in the 1970s added to the
dissatisfaction and led owners to search for ways to speed up the
38
construction process. Fast-track construction, along with multiprime contracting and construction management, emerged from
39
this crucible. Construction management was developed to serve
40
as the Owner’s jungle guide in an intense building environment.
Indeed, a close reading of B.C. Hart’s 1972 article reveals processes
41
that later grew into fast-track and design-build.
Further, the
bouncing baby Hart spoke of was more accurately the construction
management blanket wrapped around these nascent fraternal
42
twins.
A major problem with the original construction management
model was that while CMs were experts at forecasting and
managing costs, they never provided a means of guaranteeing those
43
costs to the Owner. The Owner found this problematic because it
34. JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 451 (3d ed. 1985).
35. See Specialty Designs, supra note 30, at 206.
36. Id.
37. See Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1075, 1080 (1979).
38. See DANIEL S. HAPKE, JR., DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS:
REPRESENTING THE OWNER 55 (1987).
39. Id.
40. See Hart, supra note 1, at 219. “What has changed . . . is the role of the
owner. The construction manager is the Owner’s tool, invented by the owner out
of his own need and in one sense a kind of makeshift device invented to fill the
obvious gaps in the construction process.” Id. (quotation omitted).
41. See id. at 218–19.
42. Id. A current example of this nepotism between design-build, fast-track,
and CM is the I-35W bridge rebuild project. To achieve a safe—but expedient—
rebuild of the bridge, the Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT)
announced plans for a design-build delivery. See Mn/DOT, I35W Bridge
Replacement – Rebuild Plans, http://www.dot.state.mn.us/i35wbridge/rebuild/
pdfs/bridge-replacement-overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2007). Nevertheless, in
what little information that is available about the upcoming project, Mn/DOT
describes benefits that could just as easily be classified as fast-track. For example,
the agency lists overlapping design and construction activities as a design-build
benefit, even though this is also achieved through fast-track construction without
single-sourcing design and construction. See infra text accompanying notes 113,
117.
43. See id. at 220.
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44

needed to forecast cash flows and secure lending. But because
45
the CM approach had always been about serving the Owner, the
CM-at-risk was soon created to provide the Owner the Guaranteed
46
47
Maximum Price, or GMP, feature it desired.
C. Protecting the Pennies
A severe side effect results from allowing market forces to
shape the construction delivery process.
By leaving the
classification of these market evolutions to superficial and irregular
criteria, the industry provides courts with a confusing mix of
contradictory definitions and non sequiturs, in addition to the
48
already complicated process of deciding construction cases. As
explained below, no standard definition for CM-at-risk or GC/CM
exists, nor does clarity as to how these processes differ from a
typical general contractor (GC) managing fast-track construction.
For example, an industry-standard CM-for-fee form contract
does not expressly provide for the agency relationship typically
49
intended between the Owner and CM. At the same time, other
form contracts allowing the CM to participate in construction do
50
not expressly disclaim the agency relationship. Thus, courts and
arbitrators are left to read between the lines of the contract,

44. Id.
45. Id. at 219.
46. GMP is defined as:
a) A fee arrangement between the client and the architect whereby the
total remuneration payable to the architect for services rendered is
restricted to a pre-agreed maximum.
b) A fee arrangement between the client and the contractor whereby
the total amount payable to the contractor for the construction of the
project is restricted to a pre-agreed maximum.
FREEMANWHITE,
DESIGN
&
CONSTRUCTION
LIST
OF
TERMS
3,
http://www.ordesignandconstruction.com/Glossary%20FreemanWhite0804.pdf.
47. See Conner, supra note 16, at 9.
48. See 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 1:2 (“[C]omplexities in
construction have created difficulties for some judges and many juries in gaining
sufficient understanding of the factual basis of construction disputes to fairly
decide the issues . . . .”).
49. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201 (1997), available at
http://www.engin.umich.edu/class/cee431/AIA/05.04.05_A201_SAMPLE_encry
pted.pdf .
50. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A121 CMC / AGC DOCUMENT
565 (2003), available at http://www.ci.durham.nc.us/agendas/2007/cm20070116/
80718_3692_111708.pdf; AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A131 CMC /
AGC DOCUMENT 566 (2003).
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reflecting on the parties’ interactions and taking cues from an
51
industry, which only provides further confusion.
Litigating over risk allocation in construction contracts alone is
52
expensive. Adding an ill-defined relationship between the parties
53
only exacerbates this transaction cost. Moreover, repeatedly using
the single term “construction manager” in widely-varying contracts
poses interpretation problems for courts and arbitrators. It creates
the perception that all contracts intend the same relationship, and
it increases the likelihood that courts will apply some
misunderstood standard far different from what the parties would
54
have selected ex ante.
This danger, however, also reveals an opportunity. Judges and
arbitrators are most efficient when they can resolve contract
disputes using commercial and economic common sense without
55
To this end, the more a judge or
the need to take evidence.
arbitrator knows about the economic function of the contract, the
56
Thus, the market
greater the likelihood of an efficient result.
benefits by providing the judge or arbitrator with a cohesive idea of
the CM’s purpose and the economic advantages the CM provides to
construction.
1.

Allocating Tort Liability

An advantage also exists with regard to tort liability. A builder
is often drawn into tort litigation through Restatement (Second) of
57
Torts section 414. In Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Construction Co., for
instance, the Supreme Court of Washington recognized the GC’s

51. See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Afterword: Contracts and Uncertainty, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1983, 169, 171 (“If the language of the contract cannot be made
certain . . . then courts can turn only to the conduct of the parties or to the habits
of the industry for guidance in construing the language.”).
52. See Center for Public Resources, Preventing and Resolving Construction
Disputes, 9 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 182, 183 (1991).
53. See Pratt, supra note 51, at 171 (“If neither the parties nor the industry
have developed useful patterns, then the courts will be left without any standard,
and litigation will produce only further uncertainty.”).
54. See id. at 171–72. (“Although the result might be that the ‘contract’ is
enforced, the norms might be very different from the ones that the parties
themselves would have chosen.”).
55. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1581, 1605 (2005).
56. Id. The efficiency results from a lower cost in maximizing the joint
surplus of the contract, ex ante. Id. at 1591.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
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58

authority to influence and control the entire jobsite, and
subsequently found the GC owed a general duty of care to the
59
subcontractors’ employees. The Kelley court based its decision on
section 414’s requirement to provide a safe workplace where the
60
GC retains control of some part of the work.
On the other hand, comment c to section 414 requires that
the contractee retain “at least some degree of control over the
61
manner in which the work is done.” And, as comment c points
out, no duty exists where the contractee retains only the general
right “to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress
or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations . . .
62
or to prescribe alterations and deviations.” The Supreme Court of
Washington used this comment in Kamla v. Space Needle Corp. as the
basis for circumscribing a contractee’s liability for injuries to the
63
contractor’s employee. In a similar case, Hennig v. Crosby Group,
Inc., the court held that the Owner’s right to inspect work was not
64
sufficient to create a duty to its subcontractor’s employees.
Notwithstanding an arrangement similar to Kamla or Hennig
where the CM only manages contract performance, courts will
likely make the same assumption as they did in Kelley. Thus, if the
industry cannot show a clear delineation between a CM’s duties
and a GC’s duties, then CMs will continue to be treated as GCs.
Thus, the message must be clear: the general liability appropriate
for a GC’s building enterprise is inconsistent with a CM’s decidedly
non-entrepreneurial service to the Owner. CMs fit into the
65
exceptions of section 414; their toolboxes are cluttered with
contract clauses and deviation notices, not blowtorches and
jackhammers. At their most efficient, CMs retain only the right to
66
stop or order correction of work not complying with the contract.
58. 582 P.2d 500, 505–06 (Wash. 1978).
59. Id. at 506. Minnesota courts have not rigidly applied section 414 to
general contractors in the same way as Washington courts. Yet, Minnesota has
generally recognized that contractees can be liable where they retain “some
measure of control over the project.” Conover v. N. States Power Co., 313 N.W.2d
397, 401 (Minn. 1981).
60. Kelly, 582 P.2d at 505; accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. b
(1965).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c (1965).
62. Id.
63. 52 P.3d 472, 475–76 (Wash. 2002).
64. 802 P.2d 790, 792 (Wash. 1991).
65. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
66. Alan B. Stover, Construction and Design Contracts, in CONSTRUCTION LAW §
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Narrowing courts’ expectations of control will bring the CM’s legal
duty in line with its limited, negative control over subcontractors.
Over time, this may help reduce inefficiencies caused by insurance
over-coverage and paying subcontractors to indemnify activity
outside the CM’s scope of liability.
2.

Encouraging Safety

Moving construction management away from Kelley encourages
CMs to participate in their projects, rather than sit in their trailers,
paralyzed by the fear of limitless liability. Safety is paramount on
any jobsite, but holding CMs accountable because they observed an
unsafe practice will only cause CMs to pluck out their eyes.
For example, in Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., the Supreme Court
of Minnesota found direct liability under section 414 where the GC
67
actually observed the work that ultimately injured the plaintiff.
The court later sharpened this holding in Larsen v. Minneapolis Gas
Co., finding a GC’s failure to observe the negligent work resulted
68
only in vicarious liability. Accordingly, where indemnification was
applicable and the tortfeasor-subcontractor remained solvent, the
69
unseeing GC was absolved of any responsibility to the plaintiff.
This see-no-evil approach chills proactive, safety-conscious
activity. Instead, the CMs should be encouraged to provide a peer
review of their subcontractors’ safety practices, to stop work when
those practices are deemed insufficient or back charge the
contractor for making them sufficient, and to augment the
contractors’ safety efforts as the CM chooses. To encourage
development of this extra layer of safety, the sole responsibility for
safety must fall on the contractor and any action by the CM is an
added bonus.
While this same rationale could be applied to workers’
compensation insurance, lobbying for such reform is beyond the
scope of this article. It is, however, sufficient to say that clearer CM
liability allows greater consistency in how construction
management delivery is used. In addition, as the liabilities become
clearer, the CM model becomes more precise at spreading risk and
fewer transaction costs exist to dissuade use of the model.

3.08(1)(b) (Steven G.M. Stein ed., 2007).
67. 272 Minn. 217, 226, 136 N.W.2d 677, 684 (1965).
68. 282 Minn. 135, 143–44, 163 N.W.2d 755, 761–62 (1968).
69. 282 Minn. 135, 148, 163 N.W.2d 755, 764 (1968).
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III. THE AGENCY MANIFESTO
In construction management’s first decade, risk-bearing was
not determinative of agency vel non. In fact, the position endorsed
in this article was once the accepted form of construction
70
management.
Perhaps the separate agency-CM and CM-at-risk
labels created an either/or perception: either the CM was an agent
under the first label or the “at risk” tag attached to the second
71
label, which implied something outside of fiduciary relationships.
Of course, this perception is wrong. Basing a CM’s compensation
on performance measures, such as meeting a GMP, does not
72
destroy the agency relationship.
Nevertheless, distinguishing
between a CM’s purely advisory role and its use to distribute risk is
helpful in subcategorizing CM delivery. Thus, such distinctions
should return to their original purpose, which is to define the CM’s
fee arrangement.
A. Agency vel non
Creating an agency relationship requires a manifestation of
assent between an agent and a principal that the agent will perform

70. See Note, supra note 37, at 1080 (describing the CM’s role as providing the
Owner technical and business advice; budgeting, scheduling and procuring
contractor work; and coordinating, inspecting, and overseeing contractor work to
insure its conformity with the construction documents).
71. The industry ultimately bifurcated the CM model so that anything not
fitting neatly into the “pure” CM model of flat fee and professional services akin to
an architect was swept into “CM-at-risk.” See Conner, supra note 16, at 8. At the
same time, the “pure” model became known as “agency-CM” because of its unique
and readily identifiable agency relationship with the Owner. See John I. Spangler
& William H. Hill, The Evolving Liabilities of Construction Managers, CONSTRUCTION
LAW., Jan. 1999, at 30. To avoid any implication, however, that some CM deliveries
may not involve an agency relationship, this Article embraces the industry moniker
for agency-CM, “CM-for-fee.” See Gary J. Tulacz, Top 100 CM-for-Fee Firms,
ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., June 12, 2006, at 40 (using the “CM-for-fee” designation
to account for sales from agent-CM services).
72. In addition to the arguments presented later in this Article, both courts
and the Restatements address this issue. In IPSCO Steel, Inc. v. Blaine Construction
Corp., for instance, a CM under a GMP contract was required to reimburse its
principal for construction costs exceeding $182 million. 371 F.3d 141, 144 (3d
Cir. 2004). During subsequent settlement of a subcontractor default, the court of
appeals required that the CM act in the best interest of its principal, even if that
meant exposing itself to a greater penalty under the GMP arrangement. Id. at
148–49. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006) (allowing
the principal to “structure the basis on which an agent will be compensated so that
the agent’s interests are concurrent with those of the principal”).
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for the principal’s benefit and subject to the principal’s control.
Industry commentators, however, have used irrelevant criteria to
expel CM-at-risk from the sphere of agency. For instance, instead
of simply applying the criteria above, one commentator arrived at a
CM-for-fee relationship by reasoning that the Owner accepts risk of
delay, poor performance, and unexpected cost. Thus, the CM
74
must be merely an agent.
The placement of risk, however, is clearly not a criterion for
the agency–principal relationship. For example, an attorney
engaging clients on a lump sum basis accepts pricing-risk without
compromising the agency relationship. The attorney manifested
75
consent to act under the control of the client. In addition, the
attorney consented to work for the client’s benefit, not the
attorney’s benefit.
Commentators also believe that because a CM holds trade or
76
supplier contracts, the CM is not an agent. Additionally, these
commentators find that guaranteeing the price of a project
77
78
through a GMP places the CM “at risk.”
Hence, such CM
arrangements cannot overlay an agency relationship with the
79
No agency criterion exists, however, to support either
Owner.
conclusion.
1.

Contracting Directly with Subcontractors

With regard to the CM entering into contracts, the issue is not
as simple as the CM contracting with a subcontractor. The issue is
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01.
74. See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.08(1)(b).
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2006). Indeed, the
professional norms of the attorney-client relationship provide the attorney implied
authority in carrying out the attorney’s work, without disqualifying an agency
relationship. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16
(2000).
76. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:13; Stover, supra note 66, §
3.08(1)(b); SWEET, supra note 34, at 385-86; Spangler & Hill, supra note 71, at 30.
77. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:82. Under a GMP, the
builder assumes the risk of the costs exceeding a maximum price. Id.
78. See id. Bruner and O’Connor, however, find that holding subcontracts is
all that is necessary to remove the CM from the agency approach. See id. § 6:13.
Significantly, commentators ignore perhaps the most efficient version of CM:
serving at the Owner’s pleasure and for the Owner’s benefit; providing expert
advice; spreading risk; entering into contracts at the Owner’s discretion; managing
contracts; and doing so without an opportunity for entrepreneurial profits.
Bruner and O’Connor refer to this as a brokerage arrangement. See id. § 15:19.
79. See id. § 6.59.
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whether the CM is acting for the benefit of the Owner. Agents
80
Agents
regularly bind principals through third-party contracts.
can become a party to the contract by guaranteeing the principal’s
81
performance or entering into a contract that excludes the
82
Industry customs, such as the lawyer
principal altogether.
assuming primary liability for debts incurred in the course of
83
serving a client, may also make the agent primarily liable.
Additionally, federal statute can reverse the default rule and
84
require express language to bind the government principal.
While this certainly puts the agent “at risk,” the agency relationship
remains so long as the agent acts on behalf of the principal.
Mistaken confusion over “at risk” may also stem from assuming
parity between GCs and CMs contracting with subcontractors.
When a GC contracts with a subcontractor to perform an
obligation under the GC’s contract with the Owner, the GC is at
risk for that performance, regardless of what happens to the
85
subcontractor. Moreover, the Owner has no recourse against the
86
subcontractor for non-performance. When CMs contract for the

80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006).
81. See id. § 6.01 cmt. d. Where an agent acts with actual or apparent
authority and enters into a contract with a third-party, the agent and third-party
can agree the agent will be a party to the contract. Id.
82. Id. cmt. b (reasoning that a third-party does not “manifest assent to an
exchange with the principal” where an agent, acting on behalf of the principal,
enters into a contract excluding the principal as a party, and thus, the principal is
not a party to the contract). It is important to note, however, that this does not
abrogate the principal’s duty to indemnify the agent for contracts entered into on
the principal’s behalf. See id. cmt. d. Thus, while the third-party may only have a
cause of action against the agent, the principal is not excused from the litigation.
Id.
83. Id. cmt. d (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
30(2)(b)). The rationale behind this rule is that industry custom indicates that
the third-party relies on the lawyer’s creditworthiness, not the client’s. Id.
84. United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 533 F.2d 469, 473–74
(9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, Circuit Judge) (finding the Assignment of Claims Act
requires the United States contract in its own name in order to receive protection
under the act).
85. 9 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 779D (interim ed. 2002).
But see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 10.4 (3d. ed. 2004)
(discussing the modern trend in some courts to allow actions between
subcontractors and between the Owner and subcontractor under an intended
beneficiary analysis; noting that this analysis is particularly prevalent in multiprime contracting, which CM arrangements often mimic).
86. CORBIN, supra note 85, § 779D (reasoning that because “[t]he [O]wner is
neither a creditor beneficiary nor a donee beneficiary,” the Owner “has no right
against the subcontractor, in the absence of clear words to the contrary”).
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benefit of the disclosed Owner, however, CMs do not guarantee the
87
performance of the subcontractor. Instead, the agents are only
88
liable if they entered into the contract without authority or if by
entering into the contract, they breached their duty of care,
89
Accordingly, the Owner’s primary
competence, and diligence.
90
recourse is against the subcontractor.
2.

Guaranteed Maximum Price

With regard to GMP, commentators need look no further than
the attorney-client relationship for an example of pricing risk not
affecting agency status. The attorney–client relationship is the
91
Lump sum fees and
quintessential agency relationship.
92
contingency arrangements, however, are readily allowed. In both
cases, the attorney’s fee is at risk, and, in both cases, the attorney
remains the client’s agent.
A CM operating under a GMP is no different. The so-called
CM-at-risk will not earn its fee if the project is not completed within
93
the guaranteed price.
But like the attorney assuming the risk
under a fixed cost or contingency arrangement, the CM can still
continue to act on behalf of the Owner and subject to the Owner’s
control. Thus, CM-at-risk remains an agency relationship.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006). This can be modified,
however, by agreement with the third-party. Id. cmt. b (“An agent who enters into
a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal does not become a party to the
contract and is not subject to liability as a guarantor of the principal’s
performance unless the agent and the third party so agree.”). The Owner and CM
can also modify the CM’s liability through contract. See id. cmt. d.
88. “An agent has a duty to take action only within the scope of the agent’s
actual authority.” Id. § 8.09(1). But even if the CM did not have actual authority
from the Owner, if the Owner manifested apparent authority to the third-party,
the Owner and third-party are joined in contract, and the CM must indemnify the
Owner. See id. § 6.01 cmt. b.
89. Id. § 8.08. Additional duties can also be created through the Owner–CM
contract. See id. § 8.07.
90. See id. § 6.01.
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch.2, topic 1,
introductory note (2000) (“A fundamental distinction is involved between clients,
to whom lawyers owe many duties, and nonclients, to whom lawyers owe few
duties”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 14–16
(providing the attorney-client analog to forming an agency relationship and the
duties that relationship imputes).
92. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a), (c) (2006).
93. See, e.g., IPSCO Steel, Inc. v. Blaine Constr. Corp., 371 F.3d 141, 148–49
(3d Cir. 2004) (requiring CM to effectuate a settlement in the Owner’s interest at
the expense of the CM’s own profitability).
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An argument may exist that attorneys under a fixed fee
proposal guarantee a proportionally smaller amount of risk under
their direct control and expertise. Conversely, the CM is asked to
guarantee staggering risks largely outside the CM’s control. Thus,
the disproportionate risk precludes such an attorney–client analogy
from justifying a CM’s ability to act as the Owner’s fiduciary under
a GMP arrangement. This argument not only ignores agency
94
formation and function, it also reveals misconceptions about how
the CM assembles the GMP. Moreover, such reasoning obstructs
the Owner from the greater protection afforded by the agency
relationship.
The practical reality of GMP pricing is that the contractor
rarely assumes any more risk than the attorney who commits to a
95
fee ex ante. The less that is known about the costs or final design
of the building, the more protective the GMP will be of the
96
contractor. Further, the GMP is not set in stone. The contractor
can justify an upward adjustment based on typical change order
97
arguments or it can rig the GMP with so many qualifications that
98
In
nearly any reasonable argument would justify an increase.
essence, the GMP is not a reasonable substitute for fixed-price
99
contracting. Rather, the risk of exceeding the GMP is so low that
94. It neither pays regard to the agent’s assent to work for the Owner’s
benefit nor his assent to work under its control. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). Moreover, this argument wholly ignores the agent’s ability
to guarantee performance and distribute risk. See, e.g., id. § 6.01 cmt. d (discussing
the agent’s ability to guarantee contract performance), see, e.g., id. § 8.07 (allowing
the principle to require the agent to carry insurance and utilize indemnity
provisions in its subcontract arrangements). See also IPSCO Steel, 371 F.3d at 144
(recognizing CM retained agency relationship despite entering into subcontracts
and being responsible for cost overruns); Sanborn v. Kelly, 618 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (recognizing CM retained agency relationship despite duty
to insure Owner against loss).
95. See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.08(1)(b) (“In effect, the contractor/CM has
little at risk unless it has offered a [GMP] in advance of obtaining bids from the
specialty trade contractors.”).
96. See Gary J. Tulacz, More Public Agencies Look to CM to Protect Against Risk in
Hot Market: But Who Is Really ‘At Risk’ from Price Changes in CM-at-Risk?, ENGINEERING
NEWS-REC., June 12, 2006, at 42.
97. See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.08(1)(b) (“[T]he [GMP] is subject to
upward adjustment for any of the reasons that a contractor working on the basis of
a stipulated sum would be entitled to a change order increasing the contract
price.”).
98. See Tulacz, supra note 96, at 42 (discussing CMs’ use of contract
assumption narratives and increased contingencies to insulate themselves from
GMP risk).
99. Under a fixed price contract, the contractor is not excused or “entitled to
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the GMP functions more like a cost plus fixed-fee arrangement.
Furthermore, if an arms-length contract implicates the Ownercontractor relationship, the Owner’s only protection from abuse is
101
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
But, if
agency duties are properly recognized as inuring to the CM-at-risk,
then the Owner is further protected from self-dealing because the
102
CM is held to the selfless standards of a fiduciary.
Therefore, as
hard dollar subcontracts begin crystallizing the once-budgetary
GMP, the Owner receives the same pricing guarantees that it would
receive under a GC arrangement. The only difference is that the
guarantee arises from a broader aggregate of risk-diverse contracts
because the CM is not performing any of the work. Most
importantly, the Owner’s interests remain primary, meaning the
Owner has an additional layer of assurance that the GMP buyout
must proceed solely for the Owner’s benefit, an assurance not
provided when an arms-length GC oversees the GMP.
3.

Self-Performing Work

Finally, some commentators describe CM-at-risk as a delivery in
103
which the CM ultimately uses its own construction forces. This is
not so alarming in respect to agency because the contractor—in
additional compensation” unless the Owner breaches an implied warranty of
adequate design. See United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918).
100. Cost plus fixed-fee (CPFF) reimburses the contractor for costs and pays a
fixed-fee typically based on a percentage of the estimated construction costs. See
STUART H. BARTHOLOMEW, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING: BUSINESS AND LEGAL
PRINCIPLES 32 (1998). GMP uses the same format, except that the estimated
construction cost represents the Owner’s maximum liability, with the contractor
agreeing to cover any overages. Id. at 33. Of course, if the maximum construction
cost is not set at a competitive price for the work, and arms-length transactions
provide little duty to set this competitive price, the GMP functions no differently
than a CPFF arrangement.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and its enforcement.”).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–.11 (2006) (holding an agent
liable to the principal for breaching fiduciary duties of loyalty, including selfdealing, disclosure, care, acting within authority, providing information, and
obeying instructions). It should be noted, however, that contract and custom can
modify these duties. See id. § 8.01 cmt. b.
103. See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.08(1)(b) (defining the CM-at-risk as
providing advisor service prior to construction, then constructing the project in
part by using its own forces); see also SWEET, supra note 34, at 385 (“CMs may
contract on their own with specialty trades, a system that makes them look very
much like prime contractors.”).
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employing its own forces—does not manifest assent to the Owner’s
benefit and control. Instead, this definition is alarming because it
utterly destroys any clear distinction between construction
management and the traditional tripartite system. Moreover, it
wholly overlaps the definition of GC/CM. In fact, much of the
bewildering confusion addressed here originates from this issue
seeping its way into form contracts and state law.
The evolution of construction management may be partially to
blame. Prior to 1991, the respective professional organizations for
architects and general contractors provided their own standard
104
Forms
contracts for construction management arrangements.
published by the American Institute of Architects (AIA) envisioned
the CM as an adviser, while forms from the Association of General
105
But when AIA
Contractors (AGC) saw the CM as a builder.
A121/CMc-AGC Document 565 was jointly issued by the AIA and
AGC in 1991, it presented a reconciled construction management
persona. Under the 2003 revision, the standard contract required
106
107
the CM to perform preconstruction services and to set a GMP.
108
It also allowed the CM to commence work using its own forces.
This single arrangement has been labeled both as CM-at-risk or
109
GC/CM.
As if that “confused language” was not enough to topple the
tower, legislatures have indiscriminately adopted both labels. For
instance, in Massachusetts, providing preconstruction services
110
under a GMP while self-performing work creates a “CM-at-risk,”
111
but in Washington, those same elements create a GC/CM.
As
Bruner and O’Connor correctly point out, these self-styled
distinctions are all just shadings of the traditional tripartite
112
system. Whether the image of a self-performing CM or a GC who
provides preconstruction services is preferred, arranging fast-track

104. 1 JUSTIN SWEET & JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA DOCUMENTS § 9.08, at 256 (4th ed. 1999).
105. Id.
106. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A121 CMC / AGC DOCUMENT 565
§ 2.1 (2003).
107. See id. § 2.2.
108. See id. § 2.3.2.1.
109. Kenig, supra note 3, at 67.
110. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149A, § 2 (West 2007).
111. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.10.210(6) (2007).
112. 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:13.
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113

delivery with a GC under a GMP contract accomplishes the same
result.
Therefore, these imprecise definitions of CM-at-risk (or
GC/CM) are misleading. To set construction management apart,
an agency bright line must be drawn. By thinking of CMs in their
natural function as agents, and realizing layers like GMPs and
subcontracting are not mutually exclusive of agency relationships,
resolves confusion over construction management’s application
and provides Owners a clearer understanding of its advantages.
Ohio provides an example of this more meaningful agency
distinction. Under Ohio law, the CM retains substantial discretion
and authority in planning, coordinating, and managing the
construction project, but does not perform any construction
114
work.
The statute facilitates an agency relationship simply by
removing the CM’s temptation to help itself to an extra portion of
tax revenue.
By contrast, Minnesota’s provisions for a CM-at-risk not only
115
allow the CM to bid and perform trade work, they also allow the
CM to act as a gatekeeper to the bidding process by deciding who
116
can bid and how bids are reviewed. This statutory empowerment
to control the bidding process may encourage CMs to take
advantage of their competitors.
Moreover, it discourages
competition. Few subcontractors will seriously bid work on a
jobsite already festooned with the competition’s trademarks and
logos.
B. Replacing the Master Builder
Comparing CM statutes—like those in Massachusetts,
Washington, and Minnesota—illustrates how legislatures have
overlooked the proper function of construction management.
Given construction management’s Owner-centric advantages, it
also illustrates the missed opportunity for states to improve their
building efficiency, including making design-build a viable public
contracting option.
113. Fast-track delivery begins construction activities before design of the
project is complete. See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.01(1)(c).
114. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.33(A) (West 2004).
115. MINN. STAT. § 16C.34 subdiv. 3(e) (2006).
116. Id. (allowing the CM-at-risk and commissioner to determine the selection
criteria and list of qualified firms, provided they do not impose unnecessary
conditions beyond reasonable requirements).
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While design-build allows an Owner to allocate substantial risk
to the builder and eliminates the need to referee feuds between the
117
architect and contractor (the design-build architect owes its
118
contractual duties to the builder), it leaves the Owner without a
119
Much like the
skilled representative to look out for its interests.
GC/CM problem, the builder’s enterprise risk cuts off any
possibility of a fiduciary relationship between the Owner and the
builder or the builder’s designer. Although states like Washington
120
and Minnesota find the balance of this trade-off to be beneficial,
it reduces their taxpayers’ options in terms of leverage over the
design-builder. Instead of a builder or designer bound by
additional fiduciary duties owed to the government-owner, the
design-builder can act entirely in its own interests, bound only by
the terms of the contract and a duty of good faith and fair
121
dealing.
Furthermore, the traditional design-build model is based on
the unproven premise that self-performed work is more efficient
than subcontracted work. In a competitive market, however, the
traditional design-builder cannot obtain labor or materials any
cheaper than can a subcontractor. Consequently, if the CM
provides the management expertise and risk spreading capability
traditionally touted by the design-builder, all that remains is buying
out packages of craftwork and materials. If the Owner’s desired
level of performance is readily available in the subcontractor
117. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:34 (pointing out that
allowing the Owner to contract solely with one party “gives the owner ‘a single
point of responsibility’ for design and construction services”). Design-build
arrangements are contracted at arm’s length to procure a design and its
construction from the same source. Id. Design-build is a common permutation of
the traditional tripartite system. Id. § 6:15. The Owner seeks to diminish its
exposure to the construction process by combining the architect and builder. See
id. § 6.34. From a practical standpoint, this eliminates the Owner’s involvement in
design constructability disputes. See Mark C. Friedlander, A Primer on Industrial
Design/Build Construction Contracts, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1994, at 3. From a
legal standpoint, this provides a single source of liability from which the Owner
may pursue or defend a claim. Id.
118. See Linda Chiarelli & Lawrence Chiarelli, The Role of the Construction
Manager on a Design/Build Project, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1995, at 58, 61–62.
119. 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:15.
120. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.10.300(1) (Westlaw through 2007
legislation) (allowing the use of design-build contracts on public works, subject to
limitations on project type and cost); see also MINN. STAT. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2 (2006)
(allowing the use of design-build contracts on public works, subject to an
evaluation of price and design).
121. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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market at a competitive price, (a very real possibility, considering
the traditional design-builder’s craftwork is competing with other
similarly situated subcontractors) then the premise of selfperforming efficiency fails. Thus, state laws that attach a design
contract to a relationship incapable of both fiduciary responsibility
and economic efficiency create a losing arrangement for all parties
involved.
Alternatively, if a state such as Minnesota adopted a CMdriven, design-build statute, government builders such as Mn/DOT
would have a construction expert and fiduciary advisor throughout
the design and construction process without losing the capability to
fast-track a project. Because the CM would assemble the GMP from
an aggregate of the hard-dollar subcontracts the CM entered into—
and the CM would agree to indemnify the government entity from
122
any economic claims arising from design inadequacy —Minnesota
could allocate the same risk at competitive prices. What ultimately
123
emerges, then, is similar to a multi-prime contract, except the
CM holds the subcontracts and Minnesota building officials are not
called on to oversee or administer construction progress. Thus, in
a single contract, the CM assumes distributive responsibilities for
design, management, and risk, while the Owner receives a fiduciary
representative.
Admittedly, buying out craftwork in this manner likely loses
some economies of scale otherwise realized in the traditional
design-builder’s limited vertical integration. But as long as the
Owner or government finds the added cost is less than the benefit
of a knowledgeable agent dedicated to putting the Owner’s needs
above its own, and the Owner finds value in spreading risk across a
greater number of companies, the arrangement is efficient.

122. Even in the absence of specific contract language, the CM must
indemnify the Owner against claims arising from the CM’s own negligence. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 cmt. b (2006) (discussing the agent’s duty
of care to the principal). Moreover, an agent must act in accordance with the
express terms of the agency contract. See id. § 8.07. And although the Owner has a
duty to indemnify the CM for acting within the CM’s authority or for the Owner’s
benefit, see id. § 8.14, this duty can be modified by contract, id. cmt. b. Thus, the
contractual overlay of the design-build agreement can customize the
indemnification scheme between the parties without disposing of the agency
relationship.
123. Under multi-prime contracting, the Owner contracts directly with trade
contractors to perform work. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:14.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The construction industry can outline in sixteen divisions each
material and process used to assemble a building, but when it
comes to standardizing project delivery, mass confusion ensues.
Contracting relationships today take many forms; however, these
are mostly variations on design-bid-build or design-build. Only the
construction management approach offers the Owner an agent
124
who is also a construction expert.
By drawing a bright line
around agency, participants carve out a class of contracts based on
the unique legal and commercial implications of a master builder
and agent.
Further, such a bright line warns those who may otherwise
stray into the shackles of an unwanted agency relationship. While
contract language that systematically denies benefit or control
running to the Owner militates against an agency relationship,
125
such language is not determinative. The parties’ actions can just
126
Thus, clearly
as easily impute the agency duties of a principal.
defining the appropriate use for CM arrangements and its entrance
criteria helps parties understand what manifestations to avoid if
agency liability is not desired. Moreover, it helps judges and
arbitrators understand the common economic context in which an
agency relationship might be used, and thus, when the parties’
actions are most likely manifestations of such a relationship.
As a corollary to the bright line, any self-performed work
disqualifies the CM label. Consequently, GC/CM clearly cannot
fall within the CM classification—the agency principles of CM make
it a jealous sort. Ideally, a clearer label for GCs providing
preconstruction and expert builder advice should be used;
however, the label is so ingrained that quarantining this type of
arrangement to GC/CM is satisfactory if it means eradicating selfperformance from the CM-at-risk category.
124. See SWEET, supra note 34, § 21.04(D). “Program management,” a close
cousin of construction management, provides the Owner with an agent that
analyzes the Owner’s building needs as the Owner contemplates its next capital
project. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:11. While this model is
practically identical to CM, it focuses more on advising the Owner what to build,
not how to build it. Id. Thus, it was not considered in this construction delivery
discussion.
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02.
126. Id. § 1.03 (“A person manifests assent or intention through written or
spoken words or other conduct.”). This manifestation can be any conduct “by a
person, observable by others, that expresses meaning.” Id. cmt. b.
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Although construction management has been around for forty
127
years, it still accounts for only a fraction of the building industry.
While many factors may account for its failure to catch on, high
transaction costs and a resulting perception of inefficiency are the
likely culprits. Drawing the agency bright line proposed here is a
step toward reducing this friction and providing Owners and the
industry with a workable delivery system.

127. In 2005, the combined CM-for-fee and CM-at-risk revenue from the top
firm in each category was $7.4 billion. See Tulacz, supra note 71, at 41, 43. By
comparison, the single largest contractor’s non-CM receipts in the U.S. were in
excess of $14 billion. Id.; see also Tulacz, supra note 21, at 60. But see Spangler &
Hill, supra note 71, at 30 (contending that construction management has become
a preferred delivery method over the years).
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